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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Comments on Representative John V. Lindsay's
 Article in the March 1964 Issue of **ESQUIRE**
 Magazine

- 1.
2. This article contains nothing basically new in that it is largely an edited version of Lindsay's floor speech of 15 August 1963. More than half of the words are verbatim extracts and a goodly portion of the remainder expresses some of the same points of the floor speech in slightly different words.
3. The new parts are mainly concerned with the South Vietnam situation which occurred after his floor speech. Whereas, in the floor speech he had quoted liberally from both Harry Ransom's book, **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY**, and Saulc and Meyer's book, **THE CUBAN INVASION**, the **ESQUIRE** article avoids any quotation from either. There are no substantive new points in the **ESQUIRE** article since all were covered previously.

4. In the floor speech he merely refers to the Iranian affair in 1953 and the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. In the *ESQUIRE* article he concedes the benefit of both of these using the following statements: "The successful coup which unseated Mossadegh was of great benefit to the United States and the West." Referring to the overthrow of the Arbenz regime, Lindsay states: "But for the success of that coup, Soviet-directed communism in Latin America would presumably be far more deeply entrenched than it is today."

5. Oddly enough, Lindsay, in the *ESQUIRE* article, tones down his accusations that CIA is a policymaking body by such phrases as: "the criticism most frequently heard," "the charge has been made," and "it has been alleged." On the other hand, in the floor speech, he directly and forcefully accuses CIA of making policy. For example, he stated: "To say that CIA is in no sense a policymaking body is to say something that is palpably untrue."

6. Two sentences in the *ESQUIRE* article which are new and were not in the floor speech are curious errors of fact and judgment:

a. In connection with his discussion of the intelligence community he states: "The daily chore of coordinating and cross-checking daily intelligence data is largely in the hands of the Defense Intelligence Agency."

b. In his floor discussion of the existing Subcommittees, he indicated that the members had too little time to devote to the Agency and stated that the surveillance exercised by them is "both cursory and sporadic" and also states that "congressional surveillance of the intelligence community is not now adequate."

Lindsay makes the same general points about the existing four Subcommittees but in addition makes a statement which could very well be the vehicle by which our Subcommittees in the House at least could logically respond. That statement is:

"The reasons for the lack of adequate check and examination are almost self-evident: the members of the four subcommittees themselves, by definition, have relatively low status. But even had those subcommittees both status and time, the difficulties involved in dividing jurisdiction among the four would, I think, be insuperable."

7. In the *ESQUIRE* article in the course of discussing the four Subcommittees, Lindsay admits that intelligence officials would certainly not deny the Subcommittees knowledge if they asked for it. He says: "Not even the most experienced and security-conscious officials in the intelligence community would deny the subcommittees--had they time to apply for it--access to the pertinent information that might enable them conscientiously to provide the vast sums of money that are requested year

8. It is interesting that in those places where Lindsay has rephrased his points from the floor speech he has rather consistently deleted CIA and in its stead inserted the intelligence community.

9. One can only speculate why he would add these points. There follows a brief rundown, paragraph by paragraph, of the *ESQUIRE* article.

Paragraphs 1 and 2

Paragraphs 1 and 2 are new words and are simply a different introduction.

Paragraph 3

Paragraph 3 is the new wording concerning CIA meddling in policy. Although the point was made in the floor speech, he has changed the direct accusation to the impersonal "it has been alleged." He also inserts some discussion of South Vietnam.

Paragraph 4

Paragraph 4 discusses the Bay of Pigs in slightly different words from the floor speech and uses the new phrase "not only was CIA shaping policy but that policy was patently at odds with State Department thinking."

Paragraph 5

Paragraph 5 contains the insertion that Lindsay's information and premises arise only from material and information available to the public.

Paragraph 6

Paragraph 6 discusses the intermingling of intelligence gathering and operations in only slightly different words from the floor speech.

Paragraph 7

Paragraph 7 is a verbatim lift from the floor speech mentioning Sherman Kent and quoting a statement from Kent's book.

Paragraph 8

Paragraph 8 refers to the role of CIA in the Mossadegh overthrow and the Arbenz overthrow but unlike the floor speech the ESQUIRE article clearly concedes that these were highly desirable actions which benefitted the Free World.

Paragraph 9

Paragraph 9 is a new thought referring to the explosive nature of CIA's operational involvement in international politics. It comments on the cold war and that CIA is now institutionalized in the Government in its new building and concludes that there is no effective check on its activities now.

Paragraph 10

This paragraph uses new words to discuss generally the thought that he abhors government by secrecy and that secrecy breeds secrecy.

Paragraph 11

The first part of this paragraph refers to the efforts of Herter and Dulles to sort out relations between State and CIA. A verbatim lift from the floor speech. In this same paragraph he inserts a curious twist on the Vietnam thing referring to the President's public statement stating that "The President found it necessary to reassert publicly his authority and that of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council over the Intelligence community." A defense of CIA by the President has been turned by Lindsay into an admonition and admonishing of the intelligence community by the President and publicly.

Paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16

These paragraphs discuss special operations in CIA, the Taylor Committee and Baldwin in the NEW YORK TIMES. All of these are verbatim lifts from the floor speech.

Paragraph 17

This is a new paragraph where Lindsay is asserting that all people in the Agency are career officials and not politically responsive to the President. He makes the mistake by stating that CIA is served by only one politically responsible officer.

Paragraphs 18 and 19

These paragraphs discuss Lindsay's concern for the use of retired military officers and its reliance on the service of political refugees. Both are verbatim lifts from the floor speech.

Paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.

These paragraphs discuss the structure of the intelligence community and intelligence evaluation, the Board of National Estimates, that CIA is both player and umpire, both witness and judge, and that CIA is not merely central but dominant. 99% of these paragraphs are verbatim lifts from the floor speech. However, in discussing the intelligence community, He makes the curious new and incorrect statement that "The daily chore of coordinating and cross-checking daily Intelligence data is largely in the hands of the Defense Intelligence Agency."

Paragraphs 26, 27, 28, and 29

This is a rephrasing of his basic point that there should be a Joint Committee for Intelligence along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Fundamentally it contains the same point as his floor speech.

Paragraph 30

This paragraph discusses in slightly new language his previously made point that the four Subcommittees for CIA are not conducting adequate surveillance over CIA and adds a new point that if these Subcommittees had the time to ask for information, not even the most security conscious official in the intelligence community would deny them the information.

Paragraph 31

Paragraph 31 is a slightly different phrased version of his previously made point that the intelligence community exists solely to serve the President and the National Security Council and, of course, he rejects this argument.

Paragraph 32

In paragraph 32 he uses new words to introduce the point that existing congressional surveillance is not adequate.

Paragraph 33

In paragraph 33 he then discusses the extent of congressional surveillance, using the exact words of his floor speech.

Paragraph 34

Paragraph 34 refers to his floor speech and the fact that Norblad supported him and he quotes from Norblad.

Paragraph 35

Paragraph 35 introduces a brand new point which possibly is a serious mistake by Lindsay in referring to the low status of the members of the four Subcommittees. He states:

"The reasons for the lack of adequate check and examination are almost self-evident: the members of the four subcommittees themselves, by definition, have relatively low status. But even had those subcommittees both status and time, the difficulties involved in dividing jurisdiction among the four would, I think, be insuperable.

Paragraph 36

In different phrasing, he makes the point which he had made on the floor that he recognizes the high degree of secrecy is essential to the intelligence community and he additionally asserts that in lieu of a Joint Committee the press "may turn out to be the only effective check on intelligence activities--and that check could be dangerous as well as disruptive."

Paragraphs 37 and 38

Paragraphs 37 and 38 are new phrasing to conclude this article. He makes the point that a Joint Committee could provide a useful--perhaps an indispensable service--for the intelligence community and that it could do much to maintain a fair record. He concludes that secrecy can be a danger to our free society.